A divorce agreement required a father to pay “$375 per week” in child support by the twenty-ninth day of each month. For the next thirteen years, he paid $1,500 per month. His former wife accepted those payments without claiming that he was underpaying.

Then, during post-judgment litigation, she advanced a new interpretation. Because an average month contains approximately 4.3 weeks, she argued that $375 per week produced a monthly obligation of $1,612.50—not the $1,500 the parties had used since their divorce. Applied retroactively, that calculation resulted in alleged child support arrears of $17,775.

The trial court accepted the calculation without taking testimony and imposed the full arrears amount.

Our office appealed.

In Ruiz v. Cintron, No. A-1846-24 (App. Div. Feb. 23, 2026), we persuaded the Appellate Division to reverse. The appellate court held that the trial judge could not determine the parties’ intent without conducting a plenary hearing where the written agreement, thirteen years of consistent monthly payments, and the parties’ conflicting evidence pointed in different directions.

The case demonstrates an important principle: when former spouses dispute the meaning of a marital settlement agreement, a court may need to examine not only the words they signed, but also how they consistently performed the agreement before the dispute arose.

The Written Agreement Did Not Tell the Entire Story

The parties divorced in 2011. Their Property Settlement Agreement required the husband to pay “$375[] per week in child support by personal check directly to . . . [the wife] by the [twenty-ninth] day of each month.”

That language created a tension. The agreement stated a weekly figure but required payment by a specific day each month.

From the divorce until mid-2024, the husband paid $1,500 per month—the $375 figure multiplied by four. The wife accepted that amount for approximately thirteen years without claiming any recurring deficiency.

Her position changed during post-judgment litigation in 2024. In a cross-motion, she argued for the first time that the weekly amount should be multiplied by 4.3 rather than four. That calculation produced an alleged monthly shortfall of $112.50 and accumulated arrears of $17,775.

Nevertheless, the trial court applied the 4.3-week calculation and imposed the full arrears amount without conducting a plenary hearing.

Why the Parties’ Course of Conduct Mattered

A marital settlement agreement is a contract. Courts generally enforce such agreements as written, but they must first determine what the parties mutually intended.

Sometimes the parties’ own conduct provides the clearest evidence of that intent.

In Savarese v. Corcoran, 311 N.J. Super. 240 (Ch. Div. 1997), aff’d, 311 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1998), the court recognized that the parties’ intent may be determined from their course of conduct in following an agreement over an extended period.

The Appellate Division expressed the principle even more forcefully in MacFadden v. MacFadden, 49 N.J. Super. 356, 360 (App. Div. 1958):

“Where the parties to a contract have given it a practical construction by their conduct, such construction is entitled to great if not controlling weight in determining its interpretation.”

Historical conduct does not automatically override the written agreement. But a court cannot necessarily interpret a disputed provision in isolation while ignoring how both parties consistently understood and performed it.

That distinction became critical in Ruiz.

The Argument We Presented on Appeal

On appeal, we did not ask the Appellate Division simply to choose our client’s interpretation over his former wife’s interpretation.

We argued that the trial court could not impose $17,775 in retroactive liability without first resolving the material factual dispute over what the parties intended.

The evidence included:

• a provision stating a weekly amount but requiring payment by a specified day each month;
• thirteen years of $1,500 monthly payments;
• thirteen years of acceptance without a claim of recurring underpayment; and
• our client’s certification concerning the parties’ understanding.

The wife relied on the written weekly figure. The husband relied on the monthly-payment language and the parties’ historical performance.

Those competing proofs created a factual dispute that could not fairly be resolved by selecting one calculation from the papers. The trial court needed to hear testimony, assess credibility, and determine what the parties actually intended.

The Appellate Division Reversed

The Appellate Division agreed.

The court explained:

“Here, the parties’ competing certifications created a factual issue of whether they intended plaintiff’s child support obligation to be $375 per week, as reflected in the PSA, or $1,500 per month, as supported by their past conduct.”

Because the parties presented conflicting material evidence concerning their intent, the Appellate Division held that the trial court was required to conduct a plenary hearing. It reversed the $17,775 arrears award and remanded the matter for that hearing. The court also reversed a related $3,000 counsel-fee award that had been based on alleged bad faith associated with our client’s challenge to the arrears.

What This Means for You

If your former spouse adopts a new interpretation of a divorce agreement after years of following it differently, the historical evidence may be critical.

Payment records, bank statements, emails, text messages, prior calculations, enforcement demands, and other contemporaneous documents may show how both parties understood and performed the agreement before litigation began.

The agreement remains the starting point. But when its meaning is genuinely disputed, years of consistent performance cannot simply be ignored.

Identifying What the Trial Court Missed

A successful family law appeal requires more than arguing that the trial court reached an unfair result. Appellate counsel must identify the precise legal or procedural error, connect that error to the record, and demonstrate why it affected the outcome.

In Ruiz, we showed that the trial court’s seemingly straightforward calculation overlooked the agreement’s monthly-payment language and thirteen years of accepted performance. Those facts created a genuine dispute concerning the parties’ intent that required a plenary hearing before substantial retroactive liability could be imposed.

If a trial court interpreted your marital settlement agreement without considering the parties’ actual course of conduct—or imposed substantial financial liability without resolving conflicting evidence—our office can evaluate whether the ruling presents grounds for appeal. We also work with matrimonial attorneys seeking experienced appellate counsel in complex family law matters. Contact us to discuss your appellate options.